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We build simple models for the distribution of voting patterns in a group, using the Supreme
Court of the United States as an example. The least structured, or maximum entropy, model
that is consistent with the observed pairwise correlations among justices’ votes is equivalent to an
Ising spin glass. While all correlations (perhaps surprisingly) are positive, the effective pairwise
interactions in the spin glass model have both signs, recovering some of our intuition that justices
on opposite sides of the ideological spectrum should have a negative influence on one another.
Despite the competing interactions, a strong tendency toward unanimity emerges from the model,
and this agrees quantitatively with the data. The model shows that voting patterns are organized
in a relatively simple “energy landscape,” correctly predicts the extent to which each justice is
correlated with the majority, and gives us a measure of the influence that justices exert on one
another. These results suggest that simple models, grounded in statistical physics, can capture
essential features of collective decision making quantitatively, even in a complex political context.
Social and political systems, almost by definition, gen-
erate collective or emergent phenomena. It is natural
to try describing these phenomena in the language of
statistical mechanics [1, 2], but it is not always clear
whether this is a metaphor or a real theory within which
we can make quantitative predictions. Here we address
this problem in the context of voting on the Supreme
Court of the United States (SCOTUS). While nine jus-
tices surely are not in the thermodynamic limit, we argue
that there still are quantitative predictions to be made,
and that models grounded in statistical physics provide
the simplest account of the observed voting patterns [3].
SCOTUS is the highest court in the US government,
consisting of nine justices who vote on the constitution-
ality of legislative and executive actions. We consider
natural courts, periods of time during which the mem-
bership stays constant, and focus on the second Rehn-
quist Court (1994–2004, N = 895 votes), which provides
the largest data set [4, 5]. The Court issues majority and
minority opinions, and these can be supplemented with
other opinions; although opinions can be nuanced, each
justice casts a yes (σi = +1) or no (σi = −1) vote, and
the majority of votes decides the fate of the case.
A widely discussed fact of current political life in
the United States is the strong polarization along party
lines, so that consensus and unanimity have become
rare. Comments on the nature of decision making on
the Supreme Court also point to strong ideological di-
visions between right and left, with one or two justices
providing “swing votes” [6]. In reality, unanimous deci-
sions are much more likely than 5-4 splits [7], as shown
in Fig 1. This pattern is consistent across more than fifty
years, and there is little indication that the unanimous
cases are in a special class of “easy” decisions [8].
The definition of yes and no in each case is determined
by decisions in lower courts, and thus is somewhat arbi-
trary. As a start, we imagine that the opposite definition
was also possible, so that the voting patterns {σi} and
{−σi} are equally likely, and we return to this problem
below. With this symmetry, we are guaranteed that the
average vote is neutral, 〈σi〉 = 0 for all justices. Then
the first nontrivial voting statistic is the matrix of cor-
relations, Cij = 〈σiσj〉, shown in Fig 2. While one might
have expected that justices known to have opposite ide-
ological positions would tend to cast opposing votes, we
FIG. 1. Distribution of dissenting votes for natural courts that
decided more than 100 cases. The colored portions represent
the number of dissenting votes: blue (0), red (1), yellow (2),
green (3), black (4). On average, 36% of votes are unanimous
over the 18 natural courts shown. Above, the number of votes
cast by each natural Court. Data from Ref [4].
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2FIG. 2. Correlation matrix of votes in the Rehnquist court
(1994–2005, N = 895 votes). As explained in the text, yes/no
votes are represented as binary variables σi = ±1 for each
justice i, and we plot Cij = 〈σiσj〉; by convention, 〈σi〉 = 0 for
all i, and the diagonal elements Cii = 1. Individual justices are
identified by their initials [5], ordered roughly from ideological
left (JS) to right (CT) [4]. Note that all correlations are
positive, despite ideological differences. The standard error
in estimating Cij is given by δCij = [(1 − C2ij)/N ]1/2; with
N = 895 we have δCij < 0.034 for all ij.
see that all correlations are positive. We would like to
understand not just these pairwise correlations, but the
entire distribution of voting patterns P ({σi}).
There are an infinite number of distributions P ({σi})
that are consistent with the observed correlations Cij.
Out of all these models, we can ask for the one which
has the least structure, or equivalently the one that gen-
erates the most random patterns of votes. This distribu-
tion embodies the minimal implications of the pairwise
correlations, and involves no further assumptions. We
know from Shannon [9, 10] that the qualitative concepts
of “most random” and “least structured” have a unique
formalization, namely that we should search for the dis-
tribution that has the maximal entropy consistent with
Cij [11]. Thus, we wish to construct P ({σi}) that has the
largest value of the entropy
S[P ({σi})] ≡ −
∑
{σi}
P ({σi}) lnP ({σi}), (1)
while insisting that the correlations match their experi-
mental values, ∑
{σi}
P ({σi})σkσj = Ckj. (2)
The solution to this constrained optimization problem is
a Boltzmann–like distribution,
P ({σi}) = 1
Z
e−E({σi}), (3)
where the effective energy of each state is given by
E({σi}) = −1
2
∑
i6=j
Jijσiσj, (4)
FIG. 3. Effective interactions in the Rehnquist court. We
show the couplings Jij, as in Eq (4). Some Jij are negative
despite all positive Cij in Fig 2. For a discussion of errors in
the estimates of Jij, see Appendix C.
and the parameters Jij must be adjusted to satisfy the
constraints in Eq (2); as usual the partition function
serves to normalize the distribution, so that
Z =
∑
{σi}
e−E({σi}). (5)
We recognize Eqs (3–5) as mathematically equivalent to
the Ising model of a magnet, with “spins” σi interacting
through “couplings” Jij.
With N = 9 justices, Eq (2) provides 36 simultaneous
nonlinear equations for the Jij, and it is straightforward
to solve these numerically. The result for the Rehnquist
court (Fig 2) is shown in Fig 3. The first thing we notice
is that the interactions Jij, in contrast to the correlations
Cij, are both positive and negative.
The correlation matrix tells us that a positive vote by
the most conservative justice (CT) raises the probabil-
ity of a positive vote by the most liberal justice (JS)
by Cij/2 ∼ 4%, but this includes all the indirect paths
through other members of the court for these justices to
influence one another. In the context of the joint distri-
bution for all votes, a positive vote by CT, with all other
votes held fixed, contributes a factor eJij ∼ 1.1 to the
probability of a positive vote by JS, surprisingly pulling
JS further in the same direction, at odds with the ide-
ological intuition. But another ideological opposite like
AS, with a very similar voting record to CT, contributes
a factor of eJij ∼ 0.7, decreasing the probability by 30%.
Thus, this model constructed only from (measured) pos-
itive correlations unmasks the hidden negative interac-
tions, but shows that these do not conform fully to the
binary intuition of negative influence spanning the ideo-
logical spectrum and positive influence within blocs.
Before proceeding, we address the errors in our es-
timates of the Jij. Individual Jij are determined with
standard deviations ΣJ = 0.07−0.2, but these errors are
correlated. What really matters is our ability to predict
the “energy” of each state through Eq (4), and we find
3FIG. 4. Testing the maximum entropy model for the Rehnquist court. (A) Probability of k votes in the majority. We compare
the data (green) with the predictions of the pairwise maximum entropy model P (2) (red), and with a model of independent
votes P (1) (blue). (B) Probability of each of the 210 observed voting patterns σ ≡ {σi} vs the “energy” in Eq (4); line is Eq
(3). Errors in probability arise, as usual, from counting; errors in the energy are propagated from errors in estimating the
parameters Jij. Only states that appear more than once are shown, setting a floor for P (σ). (C) Mutual information I(σi; γ)
between individual votes σi and the decision γ of the majority, compared with I2(σi; γ) from the model. Conservatives are red
and liberals blue, from highest I(σi; γ) to lowest according to data (Table I).
that for low energy states the errors in the energy are
ΣE = 0.2− 0.3. Thus, we can determine the parameters
of the model well enough to predict probabilities of com-
mon states (those which occur several times in the data)
with an accuracy of ∼ 30%. For details see Appendix C.
Just because the maximum entropy model is the least
structured model consistent with the observed pairwise
correlations does not mean that it is correct, since we
can imagine interactions among groups of justices that
would not be captured by measurements on pairs [12].
The model, however, predicts the full distribution over
voting patterns, and thus can be tested in various ways.
First, we can calculate the probability that the vote is
split (k, 9−k), with k = 5, 6, · · · , 9 votes in the majority,
shown in Fig 4A. While there are small quantitative dis-
crepancies, the model correctly predicts that unanimous
votes are twice as likely as 5–4 splits, reproducing all the
probabilities with ∼ 10% accuracy. Note that if the votes
of the individual justices were independent, then unani-
mous votes would occur only ∼ 1% of the time, while 5–4
splits would be the most common outcome. The observed
tendency toward unanimity is described by the model as
a truly emergent phenomenon, the minimal consequence
of the observed correlations among pairs of justices.
Although error bars are larger, a second test is to esti-
mate the probability of every voting pattern in the data
and compare these estimates with the predictions of the
model. This is shown in Fig 4B, and we see that the-
ory and experiment agree within error bars for almost all
patterns that occur more than once in the data.
Deviations between the model and the data are small,
but could add up to significant effects. A third test, then,
is to compare mutual information between the votes of
individual justices and the majority vote γ, as shown in
Fig 4C. The values of the mutual information I(σi; γ)
range over a factor of four, so that SO’s vote provides
0.55± 0.06 bits of information about the decision of the
court as a whole, while JS’s vote provides only 0.14 ±
0.04 bits. This pattern, related to previous observations
[6, 13], is reproduced very accurately by the model.
Taken together, the three results in Fig 4 provide
strong evidence that our model for the distribution of
voting patterns captures the interesting structure in these
data. We emphasize that this model is built only from
measured pairwise correlations, and that once we have
found the maximum entropy model there is no fitting of
the data in Fig 4; instead we have unambiguous, quanti-
tative predictions, with no adjustable parameters.
The most direct test of maximum entropy models is
to measure the entropy itself. If we build maximum en-
tropy models that capture correlations of order n, then
we generate a sequence of models with strictly decreasing
entropy, S1 > S2 > S3 > · · · > SK [14]. In this sequence,
n = 1 corresponds to a model of independent voting by
each justice, while n = K = 9 corresponds to the ex-
act model which reproduces correlations of all orders.
The total amount of correlation in the system can be
measured by the multi–information, IK = S1 − SK [15].
The pairwise maximum entropy models capture a frac-
tion F = (S1−S2)/IN of this structure. Over all the nat-
ural courts shown in Fig 1, we find that F = 0.95± 0.03.
The energy function E({σi}) in Eq (4) includes com-
peting interactions, since the Jij have both positive and
negative signs. We expect that this competition will gen-
erate multiple local minima in the energy landscape [16],
or local maxima in the probability distribution, where by
a local maximum we mean that flipping the vote of any
single justice lowers the probability of the voting pat-
tern. For the Rehnquist court, with Jij in Fig 3, we
find that more than 99% (508/512) of the patterns fall
4into just 2 × 3 “valleys” in the energy landscape. The
most populated pair of valleys are built around the two
possible unanimous votes. A second pair of valleys are
built around 5-4 splits that occur precisely along ideo-
logical lines (WR, SO, AS, AK, and CT vs. JS, DS,
RG, and SB). The third pair of valleys have at their base
7-2 splits, in which the most conservative and tightly
correlated justices (AS and CT) dissent from the major-
ity. Essentially all possible voting patterns thus are or-
ganized around intuitively understandable, prototypical
patterns. Importantly, this structure of coalitions among
multiple justices emerges from the pairwise maximum en-
tropy model with no additional assumptions; for more
details see Appendix D. The organization of the energy
landscape is truly emergent, since the pairwise interac-
tions among the justices (Fig 3) do not have a rigid block
structure that would support the 5–4 ideological splits.
A basic question about the dynamics of a court con-
cerns the influence that individual justices have on the
majority decision. One way to measure this is by the
mutual information I(σi; γ) (Fig 4C); because the votes
are symmetric binary variables, this is equivalent to mea-
suring the correlation ci = 〈γσi〉 − 〈γ〉 〈σi〉 [17]. We can
exploit the mapping of our model onto a system of spins
and imagine what happens if we add to the energy func-
tion a term
∑
i hiσi, such that each justice’s vote is biased
by a small “magnetic field” hi. Then it is natural to ask
how the bias of one justice propagates to the majority,
that is χγi = ∂〈γ〉/∂hi. But because our model is equiva-
lent to an equilibrium statistical mechanics problem, we
have χγi = ci. Thus, seemingly different ways of measur-
ing influence are in fact the same, and none succeeds in
isolating the direct effect of one justice on the majority.
In the analogy to a magnet, each justice experiences an
effective field heffi =
∑
j6=i Jijσj from the other justices. If
we imagine that justice i can “lean” in a positive direc-
tion by an amount , this creates fields ∆heffj6=i(i) = Jji.
But through feedback, these fields will also bias the vote
of justice i. To isolate the influence of this one justice,
we add an additional field, ∆heffi (i) = −(/χii)
∑
j χjiJij,
that serves to hold fixed the average vote of justice i,
where χji = ∂ 〈σj〉 /∂hi. Now we can ask how the average
majority vote would change if justice i sends a signal in-
dicating an  tendency toward a positive vote, but does
not actually cast this vote. The resulting susceptibilities,
Γi = (1/)
∑
j χγj∆h
eff
j (i), are summarized in Table I.
Using the susceptibility Γi as a measure of influence,
we see that influence tends to increase as we move from
the ideological extremes into the medians. The “median
Justices” SO and AK are traditionally viewed as swing
voters and indeed have maximal influence [6]. At both
ideological extremes, we see that Justices JS and CT have
minimal—and nearly identical—influence. Interestingly,
the Chief Justice WR has a nearly median ranking ac-
cording to this measure of individual influence, although
his votes are more strongly predictive of the majority.
It is perhaps surprising that we have been able to build
accurate models without accounting for justices’ ideologi-
I(σi, γ) Γi
JS 0.14± 0.02 0.13± 0.02
RG 0.29± 0.03 0.25± 0.02
DS 0.33± 0.03 0.30± 0.02
SB 0.32± 0.03 0.28± 0.02
SO 0.55± 0.03 0.34± 0.01
AK 0.55± 0.03 0.35± 0.01
WR 0.40± 0.03 0.23± 0.02
AS 0.28± 0.03 0.20± 0.03
CT 0.28± 0.03 0.14± 0.02
TABLE I. Measures of influence. Mutual information I(σi, γ)
between the vote of Justice σi and of the Court γ, as in Fig
4C. Influence increases as we move from ideological extremes
into the medians. Susceptibility Γi of the majority to a signal
from justice i, as defined in the text.
cal biases. On the contrary, structures that embody these
biases emerge from the model. Suppose, however, that
we go back to the beginning and identify yes/no votes
with right/left political positions [18]. Because we have
lost the symmetry between yes and no, we want to build
a maximum entropy model that matches both the pair-
wise correlations as before and the expectation values
of the votes from individual justices, 〈σi〉. This model
still has the Boltzmann form of Eq (3), but now the en-
ergy function has explicit fields hi acting on each spin.
One might expect that this is a very different model.
In particular, it could be that the correlations between
the votes of different justices are merely the reflection of
their ideological biases, so that if we keep track of these,
all the interactions Jij will vanish. In fact, the couplings
Jij in the ideological model are almost the same as in the
symmetrized model, with a correlation coefficient of 0.98.
This means, for example, that the correlations between
votes by AS and JS (discussed above) arise not merely
because they adhere to opposite biases, but because the
genuinely tend to vote against one another. For a more
detailed analysis, see Appendix F and Ref [19].
To summarize, a pairwise maximum entropy model
is sufficient to capture the voting distribution of SCO-
TUS. Although there are small deviations from the pre-
dictions of the model, its success suggests that simple
models, grounded in statistical physics, can provide sur-
prisingly accurate descriptions of collective behavior even
in a complex, political context. Importantly, the no-
tion that voting patterns—here, the competition between
unanimity and ideological division—emerge from interac-
tions among the justices in the same way that, for exam-
ple, magnetism emerges from interaction among spins is
not a metaphor. Rather than being “like a magnet,” the
voting patterns are mathematically equivalent to the spin
configuration of a very particular Ising magnet, whose in-
teractions are determined by the available data [20–22].
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APPENDIX
The goal of this Appendix is two fold. First, there
are a variety of technical issues which should be clarified.
Second, we would like to make the relevant ideas as ac-
cessible as possible, beyond a physics audience. Thus, we
give more than the usual background.
Appendix A: The data
Just ten years ago, Sirovich’s pioneering analysis of
voting patterns on the Supreme Court required the man-
ual entry and coding of data from individual cases [7].
Our task has been made much easier by the efforts of
Spaeth and coworkers, who have compiled a large body of
data and made it accessible through a web site at Wash-
ington University in St Louis [4]. To illustrate, we show
in Fig 5 the raw data on the Rehnquist court that forms
the basis for most of our analyses. This example also
shows the ideologically labeled liberal vs. conservative
votes which Spaeth et al. assigned using the criteria they
detail on their webpage (see also Appendix F).
As discussed in the main text, the definitions of yes
and no are, to some extent, arbitrary. Much of our dis-
cussion, then, is for a symmetrized data set in which we
take our samples to consist both of the observed voting
patterns {σi} and the inverted patterns {−σi}. In Fig 6
we show the probability of these patterns, sorted by their
rank. This representation of the data often is called a
“Zipf plot,” after Zipf’s discussion of the distribution of
words in English [23]. As with words, we see that the
probability has an approximately power–law dependence
on rank (a straight line on the log–log plot of Fig 6), al-
though in the present case this is true only over a very
limited dynamic range. Although we have shown results
primarily from the second Rehnquist Court, we have con-
sidered a total of 18 natural courts available in the data
set; aspects of these different courts are discussed below.
Appendix B: Maximum entropy models
The concept of entropy has its roots in thermodynam-
ics, roughly 150 years ago. The idea that a maximum en-
FIG. 5. Raw data on the Rehnquist court [4]. Black denotes a
positive (σi = +1) vote, and white a negative (σi = −1) vote.
As explained in the text, the sign is set along an ideological
scale so that positive (negative) corresponds to a conservative
(liberal) decision as defined by [4].
tropy principle could be used to build models of systems
well outside the domain of thermodynamics is a more re-
cent development, but still is more than 50 years old [11].
The intuition, which has surprising consequences, is that
we would like to make models that match certain exper-
imental observations, but we would like to do this in a
way that does not introduce any structure beyond that
which is necessary to match the data. Here we follow the
classical development of this idea, leading to Eqs (3, 4).
For a textbook account see Appendix A.7 of Ref [24].
To be more concrete, we imagine that the system we
are studying has several degrees of freedom, each de-
scribed by a variable σi; here these variables are the votes
cast by the i = 1, 2, · · · , N = 9 justices. The state of
the entire system then is defined by the set of variables
{σi}, and in the simplest case what we mean by “making
a model” is writing down the probability distribution out
of which these states are being drawn, P ({σi}).
Once we adopt a probabilistic description, experimen-
tal observations are averages, or expectation values in
this distribution. Thus, we might want to know the av-
6FIG. 6. Zipf plot of symmetrized voting patterns in second
Rehnquist Court. Error bars are standard deviations over
bootstrap samples.
erage vote of each justice, and this is given by
〈σi〉P ≡
∑
{σj}
σiP ({σj}), (B1)
where the sum is over all possible patterns of votes by all
the justices, and the subscript reminds us that this aver-
age is being computed in the distribution P . Similarly,
we might want to know the correlations between votes
cast by different justices, and the pairwise correlations
are given by
〈σiσj〉P ≡
∑
{σk}
σiσjP ({σk}). (B2)
These restrictions are equivalent to fixing the covariances,
which be get by subtracting off the means: Cij = 〈σiσj〉−
〈σi〉 〈σj〉. For the symmetrized data, we have that 〈σi〉 =
0 so matching the pairwise correlations is the same as
matching the covariances.
If we want our model to match experimental obser-
vations on these expectation values, we insist that 〈σi〉
computed from the distribution P ({σi}) be the same as
the average computed from the experimental data,
〈σi〉P = 〈σi〉expt, (B3)
and similarly for the correlations,
〈σiσj〉P ≡ 〈σiσj〉expt. (B4)
Notice that we could also make other choices, matching
different features of the data. The average votes and their
pairwise correlations, however, seem like natural choices.
As emphasized in the text, Eqs (B3, B4) do not specify
the distribution P ({σi}) uniquely. Indeed, there are in-
finitely many distributions that are consistent with these
experimental observations. Out of these infinitely many
possibilities, we would like to discipline ourselves, and
not introduce any structure that is not actually needed
in order to match the data, where “match the data” now
has the concrete meaning of satisfying Eqs (B3, B4). An-
other way of saying this is that we would like a probabil-
ity distribution such that, when we choose states out of
this distribution, these states look as random as possible
while still matching the data.
The idea that a distribution has minimal structure,
or generates states with maximum randomness, might
seem hopelessly qualitative. But in 1948 Shannon proved
that there is a unique way to translate this intuition
into mathematical terms if we adopt some simple require-
ments [9, 10]. The result is that the only consistent mea-
sure of the randomness of states, or the lack of structure,
is given by the entropy of the probability distribution,
S[P ({σi})] ≡ −
∑
{σi}
P ({σi}) lnP ({σi}). (B5)
There is an ambiguity of units; indeed, chemists and
physicists typically choose different units for the entropy
even in the thermodynamic context. The ambiguity of
units is equivalent to an arbitrariness in choosing the
base of the logarithm. Here we choose the natural log,
but in other settings it is conventional to choose the log-
arithm base 2, in which case the units of entropy are
bits. Importantly, the entropy which Shannon found as
a measure of randomness or disorder in probability dis-
tributions is exactly the entropy that arises in statistical
mechanics, and this is the same as the entropy for these
systems in the thermodynamic sense.
In thermodynamics, coming to thermal equilibrium
means finding a state with maximal entropy given what-
ever constraints the system experiences. In the present
context, there are no heat flows and there is no notion of
temperature or equilibrium. Instead [11], the maximum
entropy probability distribution provides us with a model
that is consistent with observed facts—taking Eqs (B3,
B4) as constraints—but otherwise has as little structure
as possible.
To carry out the maximum entropy construction, we
need to find the probability distribution that maximizes
the entropy subject to the constraints in Eqs (B3, B4).
To do this we use the method of Lagrange multipliers
[25]. We recall that if we want to maximize a function
f(~x) of many variables, ~x ≡ {x1, x2, · · · , xD} subject to
the constraint that g(~x) = 0, we can construct a new
function f˜(~x; ζ) = f(~x) + ζg(~x), where ζ is a “Lagrange
multiplier.” If we maximize f˜(~x; ζ) with respect to ~x, we
find a one parameter family of solutions, depending on
the value of ζ. If we maximize again with respect to ζ we
will pick out the one solution in this family that satisfies
the constraint g(~x) = 0. If we have many constraints, we
add more Lagrange multipliers, one for each constraint,
and sum the corresponding contributions to f˜ .
If we want to maximize the entropy of the probability
distribution P ({σi}) subject to the constraints in Eqs
7(B3, B4), the method of Lagrange multipliers tells us that we need to introduce a function
S˜[P ({σj}); {hi, Jij}] ≡ −
∑
{σi}
P ({σi}) lnP ({σi}) +
∑
i
hi
∑
{σj}
σiP ({σj})− 〈σi〉expt

+
1
2
∑
ij
Jij
∑
{σk}
σiσjP ({σk})− 〈σiσj〉expt
+ λ
∑
{σj}
P ({σi})− 1
 . (B6)
Here, hi is the Lagrange multiplier introduced to enforce the constraint on 〈σi〉 in Eq (B3), and Jij is the Lagrange
multiplier introduced to enforce the constraint on 〈σiσj〉 in Eq (B4); because the correlation matrix is symmetric we
can take Jij = Jji, and the factor of 1/2 reminds us that we are counting each term twice. Finally, λ is the Lagrange
multiplier introduced to enforce the normalization of the probability distribution, which allows us formally to treat
the variables P ({σi}) as independent real numbers, not worrying that they have to sum to one.
To find the maximum of S˜, we take derivatives with respect to the elements of the probability distribution, and set
these to zero:
∂S˜[P ({σj}); {hi, Jij}]
∂P ({σi}) = − lnP ({σi})− 1 +
∑
i
hiσi +
1
2
∑
ij
Jijσiσj + λ = 0 (B7)
⇒ P ({σi}) = 1
Z
exp
∑
i
hiσi +
1
2
∑
ij
Jijσiσj
 , (B8)
where Z = e1−λ. In addition, we need to maximize S˜
with respect to the Lagrange multipliers. For λ, the con-
dition ∂S˜[P ({σj}); {hi, Jij}]/∂λ = 0 is equivalent to the
normalization condition,
∑
{σi}
P ({σi}) = 1. (B9)
This sets the value of Z, which is called the partition
function in statistical physics,
Z =
∑
{σi}
exp
∑
i
hiσi +
1
2
∑
ij
Jijσiσj
 . (B10)
If we maximize with respect to hi we find the condition
in Eq (B3), and if we maximize with respect to Jij we
find the condition in Eq (B4). We have as many exper-
imental measurements as we have Lagrange multipliers,
and so there are enough equations to determine all the
parameters. Solving these equations is another step, dis-
cussed in the next Section. Strictly speaking, finding the
point where derivatives vanish yields an extremum, not
necessarily a maximum of the entropy. But the entropy
is a convex function of the probability distribution [10],
so that relevant second derivatives all are negative; hence
any extremum will be a maximum.
To summarize, we have shown that the least struc-
tured probability distribution consistent with measured
averages and pairwise correlations has the form
P ({σi}) = 1
Z
e−E({σi}) (B11)
Z =
∑
{σi}
e−E({σi}) (B12)
E({σi}) = −
∑
i
hiσi − 1
2
∑
ij
Jijσiσj. (B13)
The parameters {hi, Jij} are not arbitrary, but must be
adjusted to be sure that the predicted averages and pair-
wise correlations match the measured values, as in Eqs
(B3, B4). Equations (B11, B12) are exactly the Boltz-
mann distribution, which describes the distribution of
states taken on by a system in thermal equilibrium, where
the energy of each state is given by E({σi}). In the phys-
ical setting, there is a real temperature T , which deter-
mines an energy scale kBT , where kB is Boltzmann’s
constant. Then, to be precise, we should write
P ({σi}) = 1
Z
e−E({σi})/kBT , (B14)
but we are free to choose our units of energy so that
kBT = 1. Then it is clear that our problem of building
minimally structured models leads us exactly to a statis-
tical mechanics model of the system we are studying.
The physical interpretation of our model is that the
(yes/no) votes of judges are Ising (+1/ − 1) spins that
each experience a “magnetic field” hi and interact in pairs
through the couplings Jij. We have chosen a sign conven-
8tion such that hi > 0 favors a yes vote (σi = +1), and
Jij > 0 favors justices i and j voting in the same way.
Because we are asking to match both the averages 〈σi〉
and the pairwise correlations 〈σiσj〉, there are two sets of
terms in the “energy” E({σi}). In our initial formulation
of the voting problem on the US Supreme Court, as de-
scribed in the main text, yes and no votes are symmetric,
and we automatically have 〈σi〉 = 0 for every justice i.
Then we need to match only the correlations between the
votes of pairs of justices, and hence the energy function
simplifies to
E({σi}) = −1
2
∑
ij
Jijσiσj. (B15)
We see that Eqs (B11, B15) are the same as Eqs (3, 4)
of the main text. In a later discussion, we will break the
symmetry between yes and no votes, and the fields hi will
then be important (Appendix F).
It is important to emphasize that the maximum en-
tropy method is not a model. It is a framework for build-
ing models that capture particular aspects of the data
while making no additional assumptions. Thus, there
are no free parameters to be “fit,” and we are able to
make unambiguous, quantitative predictions, as in Fig 4.
Appendix C: Solving the inverse problem
The maximum entropy construction arrives at Eqs
(B11, B12, B15) analytically. To complete the construc-
tion, we actually have to find the numerical values of the
coupling parameters Jij that allow the model to match
the observed correlations. That is, we have to solve Eq
(B4), which can be written more explicitly as
∑
{σk}
σaσb
1
Z
exp
1
2
∑
ij
σiJijσj
 = 〈σaσb〉expt. (C1)
We note that both the correlations and the couplings de-
fine symmetric matrices. Thus, with i = 1, 2, · · · , N = 9
justices, these are N(N − 1)/2 = 36 simultaneous equa-
tions for the 36 independent parameters Jij. These equa-
tions are relatively straightforward to solve numerically,
for example using MATLAB’s fsolve routine. Results
for the second Rehnquist court are shown in Fig 3.
The maximum entropy problem is formulated on the
assumption that we know the correlation functions from
experiment. In fact, these measurements come with er-
ror bars, since our sample is finite. We would like to
convince ourselves that these errors have only a small
impact on our ability to construct the model and make
predictions. As a first test, we ask what happens when
we choose random fractions of the full data set. Figure
7 shows that, for selected elements of the matrix Jij, our
best estimate has a very weak systematic dependence on
the size of the data set, and that these individual pa-
rameters can be determined with reasonable precision.
FIG. 7. Convergence of parameters with larger sample sizes.
As examples, we show the positive and negative couplings
with largest absolute values, as well as the coupling that has
the smallest absolute value. We take bootstrap samples with
replacement, of size n = f×N with N = 895 the total number
of votes recorded for the second Rehnquist Court. We con-
struct independent maximum entropy models for each sample,
and plot the mean couplings vs. sample size f ; error bars are
standard deviations of the couplings over multiple bootstrap
samples at each f . Points have been slightly displaced along
the x-axis to minimize overlap between error bars.
Fig 8 surveys these errors in the entire matrix, showing
that all elements are determined within ±0.2, and many
within ±0.1; these random errors are estimated, as in
Fig 7, across bootstrap resamplings of the data. Impor-
tantly, for most of the Jij, these resamplings have a low
probability of changing our estimate of the sign of the
interaction, and uncertainty about the sign is confined
to the Jij that have the smallest magnitude.
While our model is parameterized by the Jij, the fun-
damental prediction of the model is the probability of
each voting pattern; the logarithm of this probability is
the “energy” of the state, from Eq (4). If the errors in all
the Jij were independent, then the errors in the energy
would typically be six times larger than the errors in the
individual Jij, and this would be quite bad. In fact the
errors are unlikely to be independent, and they are not.
To get some intuition, we know that if the Jij themselves
are drawn at random, then the correlations Cij have a
complicated structure [16]. Conversely, we expect that
independent random additions to the Cij would produce
a structured change in the Jij.
When we draw random samples of the data to gener-
ate Cij and construct the corresponding Jij, we get the
9FIG. 8. (A) Standard deviation ΣJ vs. Jij. (B) Probability
of a sign flip in Jij over bootstrap samples. The strongest 2/3
of couplings have fixed sign with 95% confidence.
whole matrix of Jij and hence a whole set of predictions
for the energies of individual states. We can look at the
standard deviations of these energies, as a function of
the means, as shown in Fig 9. Low energy (more likely)
states have errors ΣE ∼ 0.2, which means that we can
predict the probability of these states with ∼ 20% accu-
racy. This is possible only because the errors in the Jij
are correlated. Once we reach ΣE ∼ ln 2, we can predict
probabilities only within a factor of two. But this level
of error is reached only for states with energy E roughly
8 units above the lowest energy state, and hence relative
probability ∼ e−8 < 10−3. With only 895 samples, we
thus should be able to predict, with reasonable reliability,
the probabilities of all voting combinations that actually
occur in the data, and this is borne out in Fig 4.
Appendix D: The energy landscape
Maximum entropy models express the probability of
a system being in a certain state (here, the pattern of
votes by the nine justices) in terms of an “energy” for
that state, and this energy in turn is built out of terms
that express “interactions” among the elements of the
system (here, the votes of the individual justices). It
is useful to think about the energy as a landscape on
the space of states, with deep valleys corresponding to
states of high probability and mountains corresponding
to states of low probability; mountain passes provided
the most likely paths that connect one highly likely val-
ley to another. The model defines the energy for all pos-
sible states, not only those which are observed to occur
in our finite sample of data. Further, in the approach
we have taken here, the entire landscape is determined
by the measured correlations among the votes of pairs of
justices. Thus, the landscape here is not a metaphor, but
something that we can construct explicitly and quantita-
tively, with no free parameters.
In the case of the Supreme Court, the space of states
is discrete: each justice votes yes or no (σi = +1 or
σi = −1), and so while there are nine dimensions the al-
lowed states live only on the corners of a (hyper)cube in
these nine dimensions. Nonetheless we can identify two
states as being neighbors if the jump from one state to
the other involves changing the vote of only one justice.
The bottom of a valley is a place where all moves take us
uphill, and correspondingly we can ask for local minima
of the energy function such that flipping the vote of any
one justice always increases the energy. These local min-
ima of the energy are predicted to be local maxima of the
probability, and hence provide us with anchor points for
thinking about the voting patterns. A local minimum of
energy defines a prototypical vote, and the neighboring
patterns—which are predicted to be less likely—can be
thought of as “noisy versions” of this prototype.
As discussed in the main text, the model that we find
for the patterns of votes on the US Supreme Court be-
longs to a class of models known in the physics literature
FIG. 9. Standard deviation ΣE vs. mean of energies E(σ),
for each state observed in the data. States that appear only
once are shown in red, and states that appear more than once
are shown in blue.
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FIG. 10. Projection of the energy landscape in the data (A) and the predictions of the pairwise maximum entropy model (B).
The horizontal axis shows the projection m(1) onto the unanimous +1 basin, and the vertical axis shows the projection m(2)
onto 5–4 basin oriented so the majority voters are +1. The 7–2 basin lies in between as expected. Local energy minima are
marked with red triangles. Note that points are separated by at least one empty block because a single vote flip corresponds
to a change in 2 along either dimension. The space is highly structured, with density almost exclusively on the periphery and
with a nearly empty center.
as spin glasses [16], and a signature of these models is
that their energy landscapes have multiple local minima.
Thus, we expect that even our small (N = 9) system will
have several local minima or prototypical voting patterns,
and this is what we find.
Concretely, the energy landscape for the second Rehn-
quist court has three major valleys, plus the symmetric
mirror of these valleys obtained by exchanging the defini-
tions of yes and no. Together, the states in these valleys
account for over 99% (508/512) of the possible voting
states, corresponding to almost the full mass of the prob-
ability distribution. As noted in the main text, the proto-
typical states at the bottoms of the valleys are the unan-
imous vote, the 5–4 ideological split, and the 7–2 vote
against Scalia and Thomas. We emphasize that these
breaks along ideological lines emerge from the model even
though we make no reference to ideology in our construc-
tion; these structures are encoded in the pairwise corre-
lations, and the maximum entropy method allows us to
make these structures explicit.
Leaning on the equivalence to statistical physics, we
can think of the local minima in energy as the states into
which the system is “trying” to order. If {ξ(n)i } is the nth
local minimum, we can measure how close the system has
come to this state by the overlap
m(n) =
N∑
i=1
ξ
(n)
i σi. (D1)
If the system is very deep in the valley defined by {ξ(n)i },
then we will have m(n) ≈ N . With two dominant valleys
in the energy landscape, the unanimous vote and the 5–4
ideological split, there are two natural “order parame-
ters” m(1) and m(2), respectively. In Fig 10, we show
the probability distribution projected onto these two di-
mensions, both for the real data and as predicted by the
maximum entropy model.
In the projections along (m(1), m(2)), we can see the
clear local maxima of probability when m = ±N , both
in the data and in the predictions of the model. More
surprising is that the distribution is almost confined to
the edge of the allowed space. This feature of the data,
which is predicted clearly by the model, means that the
full distribution is in effect dominated by the competition
between the tendencies toward unanimity and ideological
division, and this is not just a qualitative statement but
a quantitative one. Importantly, all of this structure is
predicted by the maximum entropy model using only the
observed pairwise correlations among votes as inputs.
The idea of projecting the pattern votes onto two di-
mensions is not new. Ten years ago, Sirovich [7] noted
that the covariance of justices’ votes is dominated by
two principal components, which are very close to the
dimensions defined by m(1) and m(2) here. Although
we start with the same covariance matrix, the maximum
entropy approach does more than identify dominant di-
mensions, since it makes quantitative predictions about
the entire probability distribution. This is possible be-
cause the models we build respect the discrete nature of
the votes—we are constructing a joint probability distri-
bution for binary variables—while the covariance matrix
itself could have arisen from a set of continuous variables,
and the geometric interpretation of principal components
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analysis does not make reference to the “corners of the
hypercube” structure in the space of voting patterns. By
respecting the discreteness of votes, even the least struc-
tured model that is consistent with the covariance matrix
exhibits a very rich structure, and one that is in detailed
agreement with the data.
Appendix E: Estimating entropies and information
At various points in our analyses, we estimate informa-
tion theoretic quantities such as the entropy of a distri-
bution or the mutual information between different vari-
ables. It is well known that such estimates can be sys-
tematically biased in small data sets [26]. This problem
received considerable attention in the analysis of experi-
ments on neural coding [27–30], and here we explain how
we use what was learned in that context to be sure that
our estimates are reliable. For a more pedagogical dis-
cussion, see Appendix A.8 of Ref [24].
For the second Rehnquist Court, it is plausible that
all relevant information theoretic quantities will be well
determined: there are Ω = 512 states, or really 256 in-
dependent probabilities in the symmetrized data, and we
have N = 2 × 895 samples (again, doubled because of
symmetry). For other natural courts (cf Fig 1), however,
the number of samples is highly variable, down to as few
as 91 votes. We would like to use all of the available ex-
amples, and thus we need to understand how the limited
data set sizes can bias our estimates.
The hardest quantity to estimate is the entropy of the
distribution of voting patterns, since this depends on the
probability of every single state. The na¨ıve approach is
to identify the observed frequency of occurrence of each
state with its probability, and then plug these estimates
into the definition of the entropy, here measured in bits,
Snaive(n) = −
∑
{σi}
Pˆn({σi}) log2 Pˆn({σi}), (E1)
where Pˆn is the frequentist estimate of probability based
on n samples. The differences between frequencies and
probabilities are random—they average to zero, and as
the sample size becomes larger their variance decreases
uniformly. But the entropy is a nonlinear function of the
probabilities, and so these random errors become system-
atic [26, 27]. If the number of samples n is large enough,
these systematic errors in the naive estimate take a sim-
ple form,
Snaive(n) = S∞ +
A
n
+
B
n2
+ · · · , (E2)
where S∞ is the true entropy that we would find with an
infinite number of samples, and A and B are constants.
If we can convince ourselves that we are in the regime
where this formula describes our systematic errors, then
we are safe in taking the extrapolated S∞ as an estimate
of the entropy, as shown in Fig 11. Notice that the “finite
FIG. 11. Estimate of entropy voting patterns in the second
Rehnquist Court. Given an initial data set with N samples,
we draw multiple bootstrap samples of size n and form the
“naive” estimate of the entropy from Eq (E1); results are
shown as green points; means and standard deviations at each
n plotted in blue. Extrapolations based on Eq (E2): linear
fit to samples n > N/2 is the dashed line, and the quadratic
fit to all plotted points is shown as a solid line. Red point is
our best estimate, with errors.
size correction,” S∞ − Snaive(N) in Fig 11, is less than
10% of the total entropy, and that the difference between
extrapolations where we include or ignore B in Eq (E2)
is even smaller; this is true, consistently, for the data on
all the natural courts that we consider.
The extrapolation procedure in Fig 11 should generate
an unbiased estimate of the actual entropy. The maxi-
mum entropy models that we have constructed should,
by definition, generate an upper bound on the entropy.
This upper bound is based on measurements of the pair-
wise correlations, and since there are only 36 independent
correlation matrix elements, even small data sets give a
fairly reliable basis from which to construct these mod-
els. Happily, there is also a lower bound on the entropy
that we can construct, and this too is rather robust to
small sample sizes.
In a uniform distribution over Ω states, the probabil-
ity that two states chosen at random are the same is
Pc = 1/Ω and the entropy is S = log2 Ω. Thus, in this
case, we can estimate the entropy if we can estimate the
probability of a coincidence, where two states are the
same. Notice that if we have n samples, we can test
n(n − 1)/2 independent pairs, and so we start to get a
reliable estimate of Pc as soon as n
√
Ω, which is much
less than the naive expectation that we need to see all
the states (n ∼ Ω) in order to say something about the
distribution from which they are drawn. As an aside, this
is the basis for the “birthday problem,” where the num-
ber of people needed to make it likely that two of them
share the same birthday is much less than the number of
possible birthdays; a discussion appears in Feller’s classic
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FIG. 12. Entropy estimates for all the natural courts, as a
function of sample size. Statistical errors, as shown in Fig 11,
are small.
text [31].
To go beyond the uniform distribution, we note that
the probability of a coincidence among two randomly cho-
sen states is
Pc =
∑
{σi}
[P ({σi})]2 = 〈P ({σi})〉, (E3)
where 〈· · · 〉 stands for an expectation value over the dis-
tribution P ({σi}). But for any positive random variable
x, we have
log2〈x〉 ≥ 〈log2 x〉. (E4)
Applying this inequality to Eq (E3), we have
log2 Pc = log2〈P ({σi})〉 ≥ 〈log2 P ({σi})〉, (E5)
⇒ − log2 Pc ≤ −〈log2 P ({σi})〉. (E6)
But
− 〈log2 P ({σi})〉 = −
∑
P ({σi}) log2 P ({σi}) = S,
(E7)
and so we have a lower bound on the entropy,
S ≥ SMa = − log2 Pc. (E8)
We will refer to this as the “Ma bound,” after Ref [32].
In Figure 12 we show the various entropy estimates for
all the natural courts we consider, ordered by the number
of votes recorded for each court (sample size). We see
that entropy estimates based on extrapolation, as in Fig
11, are consistently ∼ 10% above the Ma bound, and this
is true across the full range of sample sizes. Indeed, the
entropies (and the Ma Bounds) for the different natural
courts themselves vary by only ±10%, suggesting that
the structure of voting patterns is quite stable across the
decades. Although there are 29 = 512 possible voting
patterns, the fact that the entropy is consistently S ∼
5 bits indicates that, effectively, the court uses only 2S ∼
32 of these patterns. But with these few patterns, even
one hundred votes is enough to generate a reasonably
good sampling. It should be noted that entropy estimates
based on extrapolation can easily violate the Ma bound
if the number of samples we have in the data is genuinely
too small (see, for example, Ref [28]). Taken together,
these results suggest strongly that our entropy estimates
are reliable for all of the natural courts, and hence we can
compute the multi–information and assess the fraction of
this which is captured by the maximum entropy model,
as discussed in the text.
For the symmetrized data, each justice is equally likely
to vote yes or no, and hence if they voted independently
the entropy would be exactly S1 = 9 bits. Then we can
read from Fig 12 our estimate of the multi–information,
IestK = S1−S∞, as well as the multi–information captured
by the pairwise maximum entropy model, S1 − S2. The
resulting fraction F = (S1−S2)/IestK = 0.95±0.03, where
the error bar is the standard deviation across the set of
natural courts. Alternatively, we know that the multi–
information must be greater than IMaK = S1−SMa, and we
thus can conclude that F ≥ (S1−S2)/IMaK = 0.83±0.03;
this is a true bound, and hence a conservative estimate.
We also need to estimate other information theoretic
quantities, such as the mutual information between in-
dividual justices’ votes and the court majority, I(σi; γ).
But these quantities involve probability distributions
over many fewer states, and thus the sampling issues dis-
cussed here are negligible.
Appendix F: Ideologically defined votes
As noted in the main text, the definition of “yes” and
“no” votes in Supreme Court decisions has an element
of arbitrariness, since the question before the Court is
always to affirm or overturn a previous decision. In our
initial approach to the data, we elevated this arbitrari-
ness to a symmetry, imagining that every case could have
come with the opposite definition of yes and no, so that
voting patterns {σi} and {−σi} should be equally proba-
ble. An alternative is to note that each case presents an
issue that can be mapped to the state of national politics,
and there is (except for rare cases) a reasonable consen-
sus that someone with leftist tendencies would vote one
way and someone with rightist tendencies the other. This
is, of course, only one dimension along which cases may
vary.
So much attention is paid to the right/left split in to-
day’s politics that we might imagine such influences are
dominant [33]. Indeed, it could be that each justice re-
sponds independently to the merits of each case as seen
through his or her political biases, and that what we see
as correlations reflects nothing more than the fact that we
are averaging over cases with different features. It may
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FIG. 13. Data and model for ideologically labeled votes on the second Rehnquist court. (A) Correlation matrix 〈σiσj〉 of
ideological votes in the Rehnquist court, with average votes 〈σi〉 plotted above. As explained in the text, conservative/liberal
votes are represented as binary variables σi = ±1 for each justice i [4]. (B) Effective interactions Jij, with the biases hi plotted
above.
be useful to make the analogy to the case of sensory neu-
rons. If each neuron in a network responds independently
to its sensory inputs, and we average over these inputs,
we will see correlations among the responses of different
neurons. If we can hold the inputs fixed, however, it is
possible that the correlations will vanish because there
are no genuine interactions among the cells. It is not
clear that we can do a completely analogous experiment
with the Supreme Court, but mapping each yes/no vote
onto a right/left decision seems like a reasonable start,
as emphasized previously [6, 7, 34].
In fact, the raw data of Ref [4] come labeled by the
right/left sign of each vote, although we note some dif-
ficulties, emphasized also in Ref [4]. First, there is a
problem of circularity, since ideologies are defined partly
by the actors themselves. Thus, it is not truly an exter-
nal, fixed measure along which we can consider the votes
of SCOTUS. Instead, the axis is partially defined by the
internal dynamics of the system. The problem of circu-
larity then implies a second problem of non-stationarity,
since the definition of liberal and conservative positions
evolve over time. Spaeth et al. have adjusted for these
changes over time, but it is difficult to gauge what the as-
sociation between ideological ideals and votes may be at
a given time. Overall, there is evidence for an important
unidimensional space similar to our intuitive concepts of
conservative vs. liberals, but how this axis overlaps with
our intuitions seems inexact.
If we take the suggestion of ideological bias seriously,
there are established definitions for what constitute the
two ends of the ideological axis. Spaeth et al. have used
these definitions to classify the votes as liberal (which we
assign as σi = −1) or conservative (σi = +1) [4]. The
votes that do not fall along this classification have been
removed from both symmetrized and ideological analyses
(roughly 2% of votes in the second Rehnquist Court).
Figure 13 shows the mean votes and pairwise correlations
〈σiσj〉 in the ideologically calibrated data.
Returning to the maximum entropy model, we have
FIG. 14. Bias hi against mean votes 〈σi〉. Green line traces
the function 〈σ〉 = tanh(h), as would be expected if each
justice voted independently with bias hi. Error bars on hi are
the standard deviation across independent constructions of
maximum entropy models from multiple bootstrap samples,
as for ΣJ in Fig 8, while errors in 〈σi〉 arise as usual from
counting statistics.
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FIG. 15. Comparison of couplings from ideological against
symmetrized data. The correlation coefficient between aver-
age couplings over bootstrap samples is 0.98. Error bars are
the standard deviations of our estimates, as in Fig 8A. Green
line is 1:1.
now the energy function of Eq (B13),
E(σ) = −
∑
i
hiσi − 1
2
∑
ij
Jijσiσj. (F1)
Solving the model on this data, we find the couplings
and mean biases shown in Fig 13B. If each justice votes
with reference to his or her own ideological bias, ignoring
the other justices, then we would have 〈σi〉 = tanh(hi).
In Fig 14 we see that this relation does not describe the
data well at all. Thus, even if we account for individ-
ual ideological biases, interactions among the justices are
still important. Indeed, if we compare the interactions
Jij that emerge from the ideologically labeled votes with
those that emerge from the symmetrized data (Fig 3), we
see (Fig 15) that these are almost the same, across their
full dynamic range. Putting the full model together, we
see that it again provides a very good account of the
data, as shown in Fig 16. Computing entropies as in
Appendix E, we find that this model captures a fraction
F = 0.92± 0.03 of the multi–information.
Several points about Fig 16 seem worth noting, espe-
cially in relation to the corresponding Fig 4 which shows
the quality of model predictions in the symmetrized data.
First, it is clear that the model correctly predicts the
emergence of consensus on issues that favor both conser-
vative and liberal positions (Fig 16A); these consensus
votes would be incredibly unlikely if each justice followed
his or her biases independently. The probability of each
observed voting pattern is predicted, with essentially the
same accuracy as in the symmetrized case (Fig 16B), and
the maximum entropy model again captures very pre-
cisely the correlation between individual justices and the
court majority (Fig 16C).
If we map the energy landscape in the case of ideo-
logically labeled votes, we see slight but significant dif-
ferences from the symmetrized case. We still have the
largest valleys around the unanimous votes, but the con-
servative basin has ∼ 25% more weight, as can be seen
from Fig 16A. There is a valley surrounding the 5–4 split,
with conservatives in the majority, and a second smaller
valley around a 5–4 split with conservatives voting liber-
ally. We still see the valley around the 7–2 vote against
AS and CT, but only one such valley exists since these
two justices are so reliably conservative.
While the ideologically labeled data has somewhat
more structure than the symmetrized data, it seems fair
to summarize our analysis by saying that keeping track
of the ideological biases of the justices in relation to the
content of the question before the court adds relatively
little to our predictive power. How is this possible?
The essential feature of a maximum entropy model is
the predicted energy landscape. For the symmetrized
model, this landscape has multiple valleys, corresponding
to unanimous votes and 5–4 ideological splits, as well as
the smaller valleys in which AS and CT dissent from their
seven colleagues (Fig 10). This organization emerges col-
lectively from the interactions among the judges, and we
have seen that these interactions encode the ideological
differences on the court even though we did not intro-
duce these explicitly in constructing the model. Once
the court is “polarized” along ideological lines, it takes
only very small biases to align the the polarized vote with
the right/left content of the question before the court.
One of the main intuitions behind the use of statistical
physics ideas in the description of social dynamics is that
the emergence of consensus or polarization is analogous
to the emergence of order in physical systems at thermal
equilibrium: having everyone in a group agree to vote the
same way reminds us of all the spins in a magnet “agree-
ing” to point in the same direction. Importantly, once all
the spins in a magnet agree to point in the same direc-
tion, even a very small external magnetic field is sufficient
to get the entire magnet pointing north. Concretely, the
energy difference between a single electron spin pointing
up or down in the earth’s magnetic field is much, much
smaller than the energy kBT that sets the scale of ran-
dom thermal motion: individual spins do not point north
reliably, although the collective magnetization of a com-
pass magnet certainly does. Similarly, the biases which
couple individual justices’ ideological preferences to the
merits of individual cases are weak, insufficient to induce
unanimity or even to predict correctly the probability of
a 5–4 split. What we see in the patterns of Supreme
Court votes is dominated by the emergence of collective
states, which then align to the particulars of individual
cases. This is not a metaphor or analogy, but rather the
description of a precise, quantitative model that predicts
almost all the structure of these votes from the pattern
of pairwise correlations.
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FIG. 16. Testing the ideological, maximum entropy model for the Rehnquist court. (A) Probability of k conservative votes. We
compare the data (green) with the predictions of the pairwise maximum entropy P (2) (red), and with a model of independent
votes P (1) (blue). (B) Probability of each of the 128 observed voting patterns vs the “energy” in Eq (F1); line is Eq (3). Errors
as in Fig 4. Only states that appear more than once are shown. (C) Mutual information I(σi; γ) between individual votes σi
and the decision γ of the majority. Conservatives are red and liberals blue, from highest I(σi; γ) to lowest according to data.
Error bars represent standard deviations.
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